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Using a national survey, double hurdle models are estimated to examine the impact of farmers’ 
risk attitude on use of production and marketing contracts. Risk averse farmers are less likely to 
use contracts but risk attitude does not have any significant impact on the intensity at which 
contracts are adopted. 
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   I.  Introduction 
The relationship between risk and entrepreneurship is a widely studied topic in the 
entrepreneurship literature (Block, et al., 2009). Risk taking is often considered a distinctive 
characteristic among entrepreneurs (Block, et al., 2009, Caliendo, et al., 2009, Kamhon and Wei 
Der, 2006, Knight, 1921) and entrepreneurs are more risk prone than the general population. 
Considering the fact that agricultural production is riskier than businesses in other sectors of 
economy (Hardeaker, et al., 2004, Musser and Patterson, 2002), risk attitude should play a more 
pronounced role in explaining entrepreneurship in the farm sector. Risk analysis in agriculture 
can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) how to measure farmers’ risk perceptions, (2) 
normative analysis to provide a guideline for the optimal risk management strategies, and (3) 
how risk attitudes, assuming that they are properly measured, influence farmers’ actual decision 
making (Holt and Chavas, 2002).  
This study belongs to the third category. The objective of this study is to empirically 
estimate the relationship between agricultural operators’ risk attitude and use of agricultural 
contracts (production and marketing contracts) and the intensity at which they adopt them. This 
study is an extension of Uematsu and Mishra (2011). In our earlier work, we studied the 
relationship between farmers’ self assessment of risk attitude measured on a 11 point Likert 
scale
1 and use of five risk management strategies: off farm labor, enterprise diversification, 
contracts (marketing, production and forward pricing), crop insurance, other types of insurance. 
We estimated a multivariate probit model and unexpectedly found that farmers who were more 
willing to take risk were more likely to use all risk management strategies but off farm labor. 
One of the plausible explanations for this unexpected result was that risk averseness may impose 
a negative impact on doing something new, even if its purpose is to eventually manage risk. To 
the extent that this is true, risk loving operators may be willing to adopt a risk management 
strategy, while risk averse operators may be more willing to use a risk management strategy at a 
greater intensity if the strategy is proven to be successful and compatible with the existing 
operation. In order to test these two hypotheses, we estimate the two potentially conflicting 
impacts of risk attitude on the adoption of agricultural contracts by a double hurdle model, 
originally developed by Cragg (1971). 
                                                        
1 We call this variable “Likert scale risk attitude” throughout this paper. According to MacDonald, et al. (2004), agricultural contracts are arrangement “for the 
transfer of agricultural products from farms to downstream users such as processors, elevators, 
integrators, retailers, or other farms.”  Production and marketing contracts are the two of the 
most major forms of agricultural contracts. While production contracts are agreements on 
production inputs and practices between farmers and contractors, marketing contracts specifies a 
pricing scheme and sales outlets for the commodity prior to harvest (MacDonald and Korb, 
2011). Production contracts are more popular in livestock production while marketing contracts 
are more widely used in crop production (MacDonald and Korb, 2011). Agricultural contracts 
explain an increasing share of agricultural sales. In 2008, production and marketing contracts 
accounted for 38 percent of the total value of agricultural production in the United States 
(MacDonald and Korb, 2011), up from  36 percent in 2004, and 28 percent in 1991 (MacDonald, 
et al., 2004). 
Agricultural contracts are important risk management strategies for farmers as they can 
stabilize farm income by substantially reducing risks associated with input prices, production, 
and output price inherent in agriculture. In general, farmers can retain a greater degree of 
autonomy in marketing contracts than in production contracts. Although some agricultural 
contracts are not designed to reduce risks, the risk management aspect of agricultural contracts 
provides important benefits to farmers (MacDonald, et al., 2004). The underlying assumption in 
this study, therefore, is that risk reduction is the major motivation for famers to use agricultural 
contracts. 
As in Uematsu and Mishra (2011), we rely on data from the 2001 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS). Our analysis controls for a wide range of socio economic factors. 
In particular, we include farming experience and whether the farmer is raised on farm or not to 
represent the effect of learning by doing on use of production and marketing contracts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature 
with an emphasis on the validity of Likert scale risk attitude and its empirical applications. 
Section III discusses estimation strategy and empirical framework, followed by data description 
in Section IV. Empirical results are presented in Section V. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
 II.  Literature Review  
The expected utility framework has been the basis of most empirical analysis of risk in 
agriculture (Holt and Chavas, 2002). The expected utility framework is a theoretical scheme 
derived based on the set of axioms developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) in 
which economic agents are expected to maximize their expected utility. Because of its normative 
nature, the validity of the expected utility theory needs to be confirmed empirically (Hey, 1979). 
In fact, an increasing amount of empirical and experimental evidence has been accumulated to 
document the violations of the axioms in the expected utility theory (Machina, 1987, Starmer, 
2000, Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). Nonetheless, the expected utility theory remains by far the 
most popular theoretical framework in risk analysis in agricultural economics due to its 
simplicity and the lack of better alternatives (Just and Peterson, 2010). 
The measurement of risk attitude used in this study is very simple and does not explicitly 
utilize the expected utility theory. Specifically, the respondents were asked to choose a number 
between 0 and 10 on a Likert scale to represent the level of risk with which they are comfortable 
in making decisions, with 0 being “avoid risks as much as possible” and 10 being “take risks as 
much as possible.” Any proposed measurement of risk attitude is never free from contradiction 
with empirical evidence, which are also subject to inconsistent findings within themselves 
(Lagerkvist, 2005). Likert scale risk attitude is no exception. For example, Fausti and Gillespie 
(2006) examined consistency across five risk attitude measurement instruments (RAMI) 
including Likert scale risk attitude. Not only did the authors find no consistency across different 
RAMI, they also found no significant relationship between levels of understanding of survey 
questions by respondents and their consistency across RAMI. Their study suggests that the 
inconsistency across RAMI cannot solely be attributed to respondents’ understanding of survey 
questions or lack thereof.  Bard and Barry (2001) employed the “closing in” method  to elicit 
Illinois farmers’ risk attitude. The “closing in” method is an iterative procedure in which 
respondents are repeatedly asked to choose between gambles until their preference converges to 
a narrow interval.  The authors compared “closing in” risk attitude against farmers’ own 
assessment of risk attitude measured on a 11 point Likert scale, however, the authors found no 
correlation between them. The lack of consistency across different measures of risk attitude is 
disturbing not only to theoretical economists who propose them, but also to empirical economists 
who need to rely on them for empirical analyses. The results from the two studies caution us to solely rely on Likert scale risk attitude. 
However, there is also some empirical evidence that validates Likert scale risk attitude as a 
measurement of risk attitude. Dohmen, et al. (2005) conducted a field experiment with 450 
randomly selected adults in Germany and confirmed that Likert scale risk attitude was a good 
predictor of actual risk taking behavior. The authors demonstrated that Likert scale risk attitude 
was a better predictor of risk behaviors in many different contexts (traffic offenses, portfolio 
choice, smoking, occupational choice, etc.) than other measures constructed from lottery 
questions. In a study to estimate individuals’ migration propensity in Germany, Jaeger et al. 
(2010) used the same 11 point Likert scale risk attitude and found that risk loving individuals are 
more likely to migrate. Caliendo, et al. (2009) also utilized the 11 point Likert scale risk attitude 
and observed that self employed persons are more risk loving than others when they became 
self employed out of unemployment in Germany
2. Block, et al.(2009), using a 7 point Likert 
scale risk attitude, showed that entrepreneurs who started their ventures with identified business 
opportunities are more tolerant to risk than those entrepreneurs who started ventures out of 
necessity to earn a living.  
To summarize the discussion so far, there is ample evidence in labor economics and 
entrepreneurship literature that confirms validity of Likert scale risk attitude, while no such 
evidence exists in agricultural economics (Bard and Barry, 2001, Fausti and Gillespie, 2006, 
Uematsu and Mishra, 2011). The inconsistent findings in the agricultural economics literature 
lead us to another question gleaned from our earlier work. In Uematsu and Mishra (2011), we 
found strong correlations between Likert scale risk attitude and enterprise diversification, use of 
contracts, and use of crop insurance and other types of insurance. If Likert scale risk attitude is 
not a good measure of individual risk attitude (and if that is the reason why it is uncorrelated 
with other measurements of risk attitude), what does it really measure and why is it strongly 
correlated with use of risk management strategies, albeit with an unexpected sign? Is it possible 
that Likert scale risk attitude does not show correlation with other risk attitude measures because 
other measurements are not as valid as Likert scale risk attitude, as confirmed by Dohmen et al. 
(2005) ? 
                                                        
2 The geographical scope of these studies is Germany because they all rely on the German version of the census data 
that contains questions to elicit respondents’ risk attitude on a Likert scale. Although this study does not directly compare Likert scale risk attitude with other risk 
attitude measures, we employ a more flexible double hurdle model than in Uematsu and Mishra 
(2011) and attempt to empirically re examine if Likert scale risk attitude obtains coefficients 
with theoretically expected signs.  
III.  Econometric Model and Empirical Framework 
Econometric Model 
 
In a multivariate probit model in Uematsu and Mishra (2011), farmers’ decision regarding 
use of risk management strategies was coded as a binary variable: whether or not to use a risk 
management strategy. Although it is a common approach in empirical modeling, the drawback is 
the loss of information. In particular, a binary variable does not capture the intensity at which a 
farmer adopts a risk management strategy after he/she decides to adopt it. The most standard 
approach to incorporate these two decisions would be Tobit model due to James Tobin (Tobin, 
1958).  Tobit model, however, assumes that the same underlying process determines both the 
probability that the dependent variable is censored and the conditional expectation of the 
dependent variable given that it is not censored (Burke, 2009). In the context of this study, Tobit 
model assumes that the same underlying process determines whether a farmer uses production 
contracts or not and the intensity at which the farmer uses the contracts given that he/she decides 
to adopt it. As a consequence, the marginal effect of a regressor on these two outcomes always 
obtain the same sign (Wooldridge, 2001). 
This simplifying assumption is of concern in the current context in which we hypothesize 
that risk attitude can have two opposing effects on whether a farmer adopts agricultural contracts 
or not and the intensity at which the farmer adopts the contracts. Cragg (1971) proposed a more 
flexible double hurdle model in which these two outcomes are determined by separate processes 
(Burke, 2009). The double hurdle model is also more flexible than Heckman’s two stage model 
(Heckman, 1979) as it allows for possibility of zero observations in both of the two outcomes 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Wooldridge, 2001). 
Since the double hurdle model employs two separate processes to determine two outcomes, 
the model has two latent variables. Following notations in Mishra et al. (2009) and Blundell and 
Meghir (1987) and suppressing subscript for individual observations,   
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where   
∗ is the latent variable representing the decision of whether or not to use agricultural 
contracts (Tier 1),   
∗ is the other latent variable representing the intensity at which agricultural 
contracts are used (Tier 2).   and   are, respectively, vectors of independent variables and 
parameters to be estimated and   is the error term. Note that subscripts, 1 and 2, for  ,   and   
indicate that the two latent variables can be specified by different sets of independent variables 
and error terms. The double hurdle model obtains consistent estimates of    and    by 
maximizing the following likelihood function: 
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where    is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when   
∗ > 0 and Φ is the standard 
normal cumulative density function (Burke, 2009). In this paper, we estimate two separate 




In order to establish empirical models, we need to specify the vectors,    and   . For both of 
the two models, we use the same set of variables for both    and   . It consists of Likert scale 
risk attitude, variables representing operators and farm characteristics, and geographical location 
of the farm. Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Farm variables 
include primary occupation of the operator, a dummy variable for farmers who were raised on 
the farm, a dummy variable for young farmers whose farming experience is less than 10 years, 
years of education, age, and age squared. As stated earlier, we expect risk averseness to have a 
negative impact on the probability of adopting agricultural contracts. On the other hand, risk averseness is expected to be positively correlated with higher adoption intensity of agricultural 
contracts. Farming as a primary occupation, farmers who were raised on farm, and years of 
education should have a positive impact on the use of both types of contracts. Farmers with less 
than 10 years of experience are less likely to be doing things unfamiliar to them, including 
agricultural contracts. We expect that older farmers are more likely to employ risk management 
tools, regardless of farming experience, simply because of shorter planning horizon and thus they 
are more reluctant to take on risks, especially if that could cause a financial adversity. Age 
squared is used to see if there is any quadratic relationship between age and use of agricultural 
contracts.  
Variables representing farm characteristics include total operated acres, total operated acres 
squared, a dummy variable for farms receiving government payments, debt to asset ratio, the 
entropy index, tenancy dummy variables (full owners and full tenants), dummy variables for use 
of crop insurance and other types of insurance, distance in miles to the closest city with 
population of at least 10,000, a dummy variable for farms that estimates a rate of return on assets 
as part of business analysis, a dummy variable for farms that prepare income and net worth 
statements for farm records. Farms with large scale operation are likely to be exposed to greater 
amount of risks, and thus they are expected to make extensive use of risk management strategies 
(Mishra and Goodwin, 1997) , including agricultural contracts (Key, 2004, MacDonald, et al., 
2004). The effect of total operated acres on the probability of using contracts can be more 
significant for marketing contracts than production contracts since total operated acres represent 
the scale of crop production for which marketing contracts are more popular. The sign of the 
coefficient for government payments is a priori ambiguous. We expect debt to asset ratio to be 
positively correlated with both use and intensity of use of agricultural contracts; highly leveraged 
farms are more actively hedging income risk as they have relatively less to fall back on in the 
case of financial hardship. Enterprise diversification represented by the entropy index is a risk 
management strategy by itself. On one hand, enterprise diversification may reduce the need for 
agricultural contracts, but on the other hand, adding new farm products in the existing mix of 
enterprises can be risky and thus agricultural contracts may play a role to address the risk. Our 
empirical analysis would reveal whether the entropy index is perceived as a complement or a 
substitute to agricultural contracts depending on the direction of correlation then. As for land 
tenancy, full owners and tenants are less likely to use agricultural contracts relative to part owners who on average operate largest farms in the United States and are more committed to 
farming (USDA, 1998). As it is for the entropy index, the impact of crop insurance and other 
types of insurance on use of agricultural contracts are also theoretically ambiguous. Farms 
estimating rate of return on asset and preparing income and net worth statements have more 
precise information and higher analytic capability to assess the financial status of the farm 
business. Because such farms would perceive the transaction cost for agricultural contracts lower 
than other farms, we expect such farms to use agricultural contract more often, but it is not clear 
if such farms would use them at a higher intensity. Finally, we include distance to the closest city 
and regional dummy variables to account for potentially heterogeneous effect of geographical 
location of the farm that cannot be captured by other socio economic factors. 
IV.  Data  
This study uses data from the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the Economic Research 
Service (ERS). The ARMS provides information about the relationships between agricultural 
production, resources, and the environment as well as about the characteristics and financial 
conditions of farm households, management strategies and off farm income. Operators 
associated with farm businesses representing agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states 
make up the target population of the survey. Data are collected from the senior farm operator, 
who makes most of the day to day management decisions. For statistical purposes, USDA 
currently defines a farm as an establishment that sold or normally would have sold at least 
$1,000 of agricultural products during the year (USDA 2005). For the purpose of this study, our 
sample only includes farms that are classified as family farms that are organized as sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, or family corporations because they are closely controlled by their 
operators and the operator’s household (USDA 2005). Any operator households organized as 
nonfamily corporations or cooperatives and farms run by hired managers are excluded from this 
study because we are interested in farm business decisions made by individual farmers and 
his/her families not by hired managers. Also, any observations with missing values and 
inconsistent responses are deleted, which leaves us with 5,239 observations. 
The 2001 ARMS contains a question that queries the respondents’ risk preference. 
Specifically, the respondents were asked to choose a number between 0 and 10 on a Likert scale to represent the level of risk with which they are comfortable in making decisions, with 0 being 
“avoid risks as much as possible” and 10 being “take risks as much as possible.” In this study, 
we compare this variable, which can be seen as perceptions about their own risk attitude, against 
variables representing actual realization of their risk attitude revealed by decisions they make in 
farming operation, which are also obtained from 2001 ARMS data.   
Figure 1 presents the histogram of Likert Risk Attitude measured on a 11 point Likert scale.  
A huge spike in the middle of distribution (Figure 1) shows that the majority of respondents 
chose 5 at the center of the Likert scale, indicating that most farmers consider themselves as 
neither risk taking or risk averse.  However, this may not necessarily mean that those who chose 
5 are risk neutral in terms of curvature of utility function, as there is no theoretical connection 
between this question and respondents’ utility function. 
Table 1 lists variable used in this study and their definitions. It also shows the mean for the 
entire sample as well as conditional means for observations with Likert scale risk attitude less 
than 5, equal to 5 and greater than 5. A significant F statistic for one way ANOVA in the last 
column indicates that the conditional means for the three groups are different from each other. 
For production contract, the mean values for both the use and the intensity of use are higher for 
those who have a higher score on Likert scale risk attitude. The pattern is more conspicuous for 
marketing contracts, demonstrated by much larger F statistics (55.39 and 30.59). Most variables, 
except for regional dummy variables, have a significant F statistic, indicating some correlation 
between Likert scale risk attitude and independent variables, although it does not control for any 
confounding factors. 
 
V.  Empirical Results 
 
  Table 2 and Table 3 present the results from the double hurdle model for production 
contracts and marketing contracts, respectively. Column heading “Tier 1” corresponds to 
equation (1) that estimates whether a farmer uses contracts (either production or marketing) and 
“Tier 2” refers to equation (2) in which the intensity of contract use is estimated. We compare 
parameter estimates from both models, highlighting different impacts of regressor on production 
and marketing contracts.   Our primary interest in these double hurdle models is the impact of Likert scale risk attitude 
on use of agricultural contracts. The results in Tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficients of Likert 
scale risk attitude are positive and significant in Tier 1; those who are willing to take more risk 
are more likely to use both production and marketing contracts as observed in our earlier work 
(Uematsu and Mishra, 2011). This is consistent with the hypothesis we stated earlier that 
adopting a new practice poses risk to farmers, even if the practice is designed to eventually 
diversify and reduce risks. The finding here is in line with Dohmen et al. (2005) who found that 
Likert scale risk attitude is a good predictor of actual risk taking behavior.  
  In contrast, Likert scale risk attitude does not have a significant coefficient in Tier 2 in both 
models. The risk attitude of farm operators does not influence the intensity at which they 
incorporate production or marketing contracts in their farm business portfolio. Risk attitude may 
have conflicting impacts on the intensity of contract use once they are adopted. For those farmers 
who could successfully reduce income risk by integrating agricultural contracts into the existing 
farming operation, risk averseness may lead to adopting the contracts at a greater intensity. 
However, if agricultural contracts do not live up to farmers’ risk reduction expectation, risk 
averse farmers may choose to keep the contracts at a relatively low intensity, or abandon it 
altogether, and search for other risk management alternatives. 
  As expected, farming as a primary occupation is positively correlated with the use of both 
production and marketing contracts, but not with the intensity. The positive impact of age on the 
use of production contracts also confirms our expectation that older farmers are also more likely 
to use production contract. Total operated acres exhibit different impact on the use of production 
and marketing contracts. The results in Table 2 show that, in both Tiers 1and 2, total operated 
acres unexpectedly have a negative impact on the use of production contract, but the negative 
impact mitigates as total operated acres increase indicated by the positive coefficient on the 
squared term. The results here are contrary to the general trend in U.S. that larger farmers are 
more likely to utilize contracts (MacDonald and Korb, 2011, MacDonald, et al., 2004).  Given 
the fact that production contracts are more widely used in livestock production, total operated 
acres may not represent the size of livestock farms as well as it does for crop farms.  In the 
marketing production models (Table 3), on the other hand, total operated acres has a positive and 
significant coefficient in Tier 1 and a negative and significant coefficient in Tier 2; farms with 
larger total operated acres are more likely to use marketing contracts. The negative coefficient of total operated acres in Tier 2 may be an artifact of the way the dependent variable is coded. 
Farms with large operated acres are likely to have higher value of production under marketing 
contracts, but the share of value of production under marketing contracts in total value of 
production may become lower as such farms are also expected to have higher total value of 
production. 
  Government payments are positively correlated with use of both production and marketing 
contracts and intensity of use for production contract. Government payments can be seen as a 
tool to reduce income risk as they provide a stable stream of income. The fact that farmers 
receiving government payments are more likely to use agricultural contracts suggests that they 
play a complimentary role to agricultural contracts in risk management. Debt to asset ratio has a 
positive coefficient in Tier 1 in the production contracts model (Table 2) and in Tier 2 in the 
marketing contracts model (Table 3), which is consistent with our expectation. The entropy 
index for enterprise diversification is positively correlated with use of both production and 
marketing contracts. We discussed earlier that enterprise diversification can be positively 
correlated with use of agricultural contracts if the decision to grow a new commodity poses risk 
to farmers. The finding here confirms not only supports the claim but also reiterate the 
significance of risk perceived by farmers when they taken on a new practice, be it a new 
commodity or a new risk management strategy, for the first time. 
  Land tenancy variables exhibit very mixed results. Results in Table 2 demonstrate that full 
owners are more likely to use production contracts (Tier 1) at a greater intensity (Tier 2), 
whereas full tenants are less likely to use production contracts (Tier 2) and, even if they use 
them, they do so at a lower intensity (Tier 2). Land ownership is positively correlated with use 
and intensity of use of production contracts. To the extent that capital investment is necessary for 
growing commodities under production contracts, land ownership may be an important 
determinant for farmers to take on production contracts. In Table 3, on the other hand, we 
observe that full owners are less likely to use marketing contracts (Tier 1) but if they use them, 
they do so at a greater intensity (Tier 2). Full tenants use marketing contracts at a lower intensity 
(Tier 2). For both production and marketing contracts, use of crop insurance has a positive 
coefficient in Tier 1 (even though it is not significant for production contracts) and a negative 
coefficient in Tier 2. Again, we argue that farmers may perceive risk in signing legally binding 
contracts for the first time and thus crop insurance can work as a complimentary risk management strategy. However, for those farmers who use agricultural contracts at a greater 
intensity, crop insurance may be less important as they become fully able to handle risk through 
agricultural contracts. The same argument holds true for use of other insurance programs in both 
models as it has a positive coefficient in Tier 1  and a negative coefficient in Tier 2 (not 
significant for marketing contracts). The distance from the farm to the closest city with a 
population of at least 10,000 has a negative and significant impact on use of both production and 
marketing contracts. The availability of and physical distance to contractors may be a barrier to 
potential users of agricultural contracts. As expected, preparing income and net worth statement 
positively influence use of marketing contracts (Tier 1, Table 3). Transaction cost of marketing 
contracts, e.g., understanding specific terms and conditions of the contract, may be lower for 
farmers who regularly assess financial position of the farm business. 
  Farm type dummy variables mostly obtained significant coefficients in both models. High 
value crops farms are more likely to use both production and marketing contracts at a higher 
intensity. Livestock farms (excluding dairy farms) are more likely to use production contracts 
(Tier 1) at a greater intensity (Tier 2) but less likely to use marketing contracts (Tier 1, Table 3), 
as suggested by MacDonald and Korb (2011) and MacDonald, et al. (2004). Dairy farms are less 
likely to use production contracts (Tier 1, Table 2) but they are more likely to use marketing 
contracts at a greater intensity (Table 3). 
  For both production contracts and marketing contracts, geographical location of the farm 
has a significant explanatory power. Note that all the coefficients for regional dummy variables 
are relative to the base group of farms located in the Heartland region. In the production 
contracts model (Table 2), only farms in the Southern Sea Board region is more likely to use 
production contracts while farm in the Northern Great Plains region, the Prairie Gateway region, 
the Fruitful Rim region, the Basin and Range region, and the Mississippi Portal region are less 
likely to use production contracts. Coefficient estimates in Tier 2 show that farms in the Prairie 
Gateway region, the Eastern Upland region, the Southern Sea Board region, and the Mississippi 
Portal region adopt production contracts at a higher intensity than farms in the Heartland region. 
In the marketing contracts model (Table 3), farms in the Southern Sea Board region, the Fruitful 
Rim region, and the Mississippi Portal region are more likely to use marketing contracts but 
farms in the Prairie Gateway and the Eastern Upland regions are less likely to use marketing 
contracts, again, relative to the farms in the Heartland region. Remarkably, all the regional dummy variables have a positive and significant coefficient in Tier 2, suggesting that farms in 
the Heartland region use marketing contracts at the lowest intensity. Mostly significant 
coefficients for the regional dummy variables underscore the importance of heterogeneity 
attributable to geographical location of the farm. 
  
VI.  Conclusion 
 
  Risk analysis in agricultural economics often requires an accurate measurement of 
individual risk attitude. Agricultural economists often rely on the expected utility framework to 
quantify risk attitude, but any proposed measurement of risk attitude is never free from 
contradiction with empirical evidence (Lagerkvist, 2005). In our earlier work, Uematsu and 
Mishra (2011) utilize self assessment of risk attitude measured on a 11 point Likert scale to 
estimate its impact on use of five different risk management strategies. We unexpectedly found 
that farmers who are willing to take more risk are more likely to adopt all risk management 
strategies but off farm employment. In addition, the existing studies in agricultural economics 
documented inconsistency across different measures of risk attitude, including the one measured 
on a Likert scale (Bard and Barry, 2001, Fausti and Gillespie, 2006). Outside the realm of 
agricultural economics, however, Likert scale risk attitude was found to be a better predictor of 
actual individual behavior in the face of risk in various social contexts than other measures or 
risk attitude (Dohmen, et al., 2005). A number of empirical studies have utilized Likert scale risk 
attitude and obtained theoretically consistent results (Block, et al., 2009, Caliendo, et al., 2009, 
Jaeger, et al., 2010). 
  The objective of this study was to empirically examine the hypothesis gleaned from the 
unexpected results in Uematsu and Mishra (2011). That is, risk averseness may be a deterrent to 
doing something new, even if its purpose is to eventually manage risk. To the extent that this is 
true, risk loving operators may be willing to adopt a risk management strategy, while risk averse 
operators may be more willing to use a risk management strategy at a greater intensity if the 
strategy is proven to be successful and compatible with the existing operation. We employed a 
double hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) in order to estimate two different effects of risk attitude on 
use of two types of agricultural contracts: production and marketing. The results partially 
confirmed our expectation. Likert scale risk attitude has a positive impact on use of both 
production and marketing strategies, but it has no impact on the intensity at which these contracts are adopted. The finding in this study is theoretically consistent in the sense that risk averse 
farmers are less likely to use agricultural contracts, which may pose a considerable amount of 
risk to those who have never used it before. It adds to the list of empirical studies (Block, et al., 
2009, Caliendo, et al., 2009, Jaeger, et al., 2010) that utilized Likert scale risk attitude and 
obtained theoretically consistent results. 
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   Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 




Sample  Risk < 5  Risk = 5  Risk > 5 
Risk (Measured on 11 point Likert scale)  5.08   2.37   5.00   7.56    
Production Contracts (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)   0.10   0.09  0.10   0.12    5.41  *** 
Production Contracts Percentage =(Total Value of 
Production under Production Contracts/ Total 
Value of Production) 
0.09   0.08   0.09   0.10   3.04  ** 
Marketing Contracts (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.22    0.15   0.21   0.29  55.39  *** 
Marketing Contracts Percentage =(Total Value of 
Production under Marketing Contracts/ Total Value 
of Production) 
0.13   0.09   0.13   0.17   30.59  *** 
Farmer Variables 
Primary Occupation (=1 if farming, 0 otherwise)  0.69   0.59   0.70   0.78   78.68  *** 
Raised on Farm (=1 if Yes, 0 No)  0.82   0.80   0.83   0.83   4.18  ** 
Young Farmer (=1 if less than 10 years of farming 
experience, 0 otherwise) 
0.16   0.17   0.15   0.17   1.38   
Operator’s years of formal education  13.44   13.21   13.35   13.73   29.16  *** 
Operator’s age  53.94   56.57   54.67   51.04   92.57  *** 
Operator’s age squared  3,074.44   3,384.28   3,138.57   2,748.84   95.77  *** 
Farm Variables 
Total operated acres  1.41   1.00   1.37   1.82   8.86  *** 
Total operated acres squared  38.06   53.69   22.03   36.37   0.36   
Government payment (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  29.24   16.32   29.34   40.69   27.52  *** 
Debt to Asset Ratio(=Total Debt/Total Asset)  0.18   0.11   0.21   0.21   4.57  ** 
Entropy Index (ranges from 0   not diversified at 
all to 1   completely diversified) 
0.02   0.02   0.02   0.03   25.13  *** 
Full owner (=1 if farm is a full owner, 0 otherwise)  0.39   0.50   0.38   0.31   75.6  *** 
Part owner (=1 if farm is a part owner, 0 otherwise)   0.49   0.41  0.50   0.55  37.56  *** 
Tenant (=1 if farm is a tenant, 0 otherwise)  0.12   0.09   0.13   0.15   12.15  *** 
Crop Insurance (=1 if farm purchases crop 
insurance, 0 otherwise) 
0.35   0.25   0.36   0.45   81.48  *** 
Other Insurance (=1 if farm purchases other types 
of insurance, 0 otherwise) 
0.89   0.84   0.89   0.93   44.05  *** 
Miles (Distance to the closest city with population 
of at least 10,000) 
0.03   0.03   0.04   0.03   0.58   
Rate of Return (=1 if Rate of Return is estimated, 0 
otherwise) 
0.76   0.53   0.75   0.97   76.89  *** 
Statement (=1 if Farm keeps income and net worth 
statement, 0 otherwise) 
0.47   0.34   0.47   0.60   129.44  *** 
Farm Type Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
High Value Crops   0.11   0.09   0.11   0.14   8.64  *** Livestock (excluding dairy farms)  0.44   0.50   0.43   0.38   28.38  *** 
Dairy   0.09   0.07   0.09   0.10   4.71  *** 
Regional Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
Heartland   0.13   0.13   0.13   0.14   0.63   
Northern Crescent  0.13   0.13   0.13   0.13   0.02   
Northern Great Plains  0.07   0.05   0.06   0.08   8.3  *** 
Prairie Gateway  0.12   0.11   0.13   0.11   1.4   
Eastern Upland  0.13   0.17   0.12   0.10   24.05  *** 
Southern Sea Board  0.14   0.14   0.14   0.13   0.02   
Fruitful Rim  0.15   0.13   0.16   0.16   3.01  ** 
Basin and Range  0.05   0.05   0.05   0.05   0.67   
Mississippi Portal  0.09   0.09   0.10   0.09   0.28   
Number of Observations  5239  1759  1509  1971     
*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
   Table 2: Double Hurdle Model for Use of Production Contracts 
Variables 
Tier 1  Tier 2 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  P value  Coefficient  Std. Err.  P value 
Likert Scale Risk Attitude  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.68 
Operator Variables 
Primary Occupation  0.99  0.08  0.00   0.02  0.02  0.21 
Raised on Farm  0.14  0.09  0.13   0.03  0.02  0.11 
Young farmers   0.03  0.09  0.73  0.01  0.02  0.62 
Education   0.02  0.02  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.29 
Age  0.07  0.02  0.00   0.01  0.01  0.02 
Age Squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
Farm Variables 
Total Operated Acres   0.11  0.03  0.00   0.07  0.01  0.00 
Total Operated Acres Squared  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Government Payments  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.05 
Debt to Asset Ratio  0.04  0.02  0.03   0.01  0.03  0.67 
Entropy Index   5.57  0.51  0.00  0.18  0.11  0.12 
Full Owner  0.20  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.00 
Full Tenant   0.21  0.12  0.09   0.10  0.04  0.01 
Crop Insurance  0.12  0.09  0.17   0.05  0.02  0.02 
Other Insurance  0.82  0.17  0.00   0.11  0.06  0.06 
Miles   0.49  0.20  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.48 
Rate of Return  0.03  0.03  0.40  0.01  0.01  0.27 
Statement  0.07  0.07  0.31   0.02  0.02  0.21 
Farm Type Variables 
High Value Crops   0.16  0.14  0.27  0.11  0.05  0.02 
Livestock  1.47  0.10  0.00  0.37  0.03  0.00 
Dairy   0.37  0.17  0.03   0.09  0.07  0.18 
Regional Dummy Variables 
Northern Crescent   0.06  0.13  0.63   0.02  0.04  0.57 
Northern Great Plains   1.19  0.26  0.00   0.18  0.12  0.13 
Prairie Gateway   1.39  0.23  0.00  0.22  0.09  0.01 
Eastern Upland  0.05  0.12  0.66  0.10  0.03  0.00 
Southern Sea Board  0.66  0.10  0.00  0.11  0.03  0.00 
Fruitful Rim   0.56  0.13  0.00  0.06  0.04  0.10 
Basin and Range   0.75  0.21  0.00   0.03  0.08  0.71 
Mississippi Portal   0.54  0.16  0.00  0.10  0.05  0.03 
Constant   5.22  0.64  0.00  0.97  0.15  0.00 
Sigma  0.16  0.00  0.00 
Number of Observations = 5239  Log Likelihood =  757.93 
 
   Table 3: Double Hurdle Model for Use of Marketing Contracts 
Variables 
Tier 1  Tier 2 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  P value  Coefficient  Std. Err.  P value 
Likert Scale Risk Attitude  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.39 
Operator Variables 
Primary Occupation  0.48  0.07  0.00   0.06  0.04  0.18 
Raised on Farm  0.19  0.07  0.01   0.02  0.04  0.49 
Young farmers   0.16  0.07  0.03  0.10  0.04  0.01 
Education  0.02  0.01  0.13  0.00  0.01  0.58 
Age   0.01  0.01  0.65  0.00  0.01  0.97 
Age Squared  0.00  0.00  0.93  0.00  0.00  0.58 
Farm Variables 
Total Operated Acres  0.02  0.01  0.01   0.01  0.01  0.05 
Total Operated Acres Squared  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.28 
Government Payments  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.20 
Debt to Asset Ratio   0.01  0.03  0.64  0.09  0.04  0.02 
Entropy Index   1.17  0.47  0.01   0.03  0.19  0.86 
Full Owner   0.16  0.06  0.01  0.06  0.03  0.07 
Full Tenant  0.07  0.07  0.26   0.06  0.03  0.06 
Crop Insurance  0.43  0.05  0.00   0.07  0.03  0.01 
Other Insurance  0.24  0.10  0.02   0.06  0.05  0.30 
Miles   0.21  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.16 
Rate of Return  0.03  0.02  0.21  0.00  0.01  0.82 
Statement  0.12  0.05  0.02   0.02  0.03  0.37 
Farm Type Variables 
High Value Crops   0.02  0.08  0.81  0.19  0.04  0.00 
Livestock   0.82  0.07  0.00   0.05  0.05  0.25 
Dairy  0.64  0.08  0.00  0.32  0.04  0.00 
Regional Dummy Variables 
Northern Crescent  0.06  0.09  0.50  0.39  0.06  0.00 
Northern Great Plains   0.10  0.10  0.36  0.39  0.06  0.00 
Prairie Gateway   0.18  0.10  0.06  0.45  0.06  0.00 
Eastern Upland   0.43  0.13  0.00  0.27  0.09  0.00 
Southern Sea Board  0.39  0.09  0.00  0.49  0.05  0.00 
Fruitful Rim  0.55  0.09  0.00  0.54  0.06  0.00 
Basin and Range  0.15  0.13  0.25  0.40  0.07  0.00 
Mississippi Portal  0.37  0.09  0.00  0.41  0.05  0.00 
Constant   1.85  0.42  0.00  0.15  0.21  0.47 
Sigma  0.32  0.01  0.00 
Number of Observations = 5239  Log Likelihood = 2085.77 
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